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Compensatory Contempt to Collect Money 
DOUG RENDLEMAN* 
This Article examines three lawsuits that raise basic questions about 
contempt and its relation to analogous doctrines. The more precise issue it 
analyzes is when to substitute compensatory contempt for the usual 
devices that creditors use to search for and capture debtors' assets. The 
judgment collection system is creaky and hard to operate, partly because it 
protects debtors and third parties and partly because it retains esoteric 
distinctions, hypertechnical refinements, and archaic mannerisms. Thus, 
creditors resort to lesser known but more expeditious equitable devices 
like compensatory contempt. Before examining the lawsuits, the Article 
will develop some 
BACKGROUND. 
Judges possess two primary tools to enforce private rights: money 
judgments and injunctions. In the main, judgments and injunctions are 
enforced differently. Judgment creditors use writs of execution to collect 
judgments from debtors' property without involving the debtors 
personally. On the other hand, defendants who are enjoined are 
constrained to comport their conduct to the injunction's dictates; and if 
they disdain to obey, judges fine and imprison to coerce them to conform. 
Observers thus say the law acts in rem, equity in personam. The foregoing 
legal and equitable roles, however, may be reversed. 1 Equity creditors may 
use legal devices such as execution to collect money from equitable 
defendants. When execution, the legal remedy, proves to be inadequate, 
the judgment creditor may summon the debtor to an interrogatory or 
supplementary proceeding or file a creditor's bill; and the judge may enter 
personal orders, for example, to coerce testimony and conveyances or to 
enjoin transfers.2 
If a plaintiff's damage remedy is inadequate, the judge enjoins to 
allow the plaintiff to enjoy the rights in fact. When judges order defendants 
to do or refrain from doing something, they may use coercive contempt to 
secure the fruits of victory for the plaintiff. When, however, a defendant 
violates an injunction or other order, the judge, finding that it is too late to 
coerce obedience, has two retrospective remedies. The first is criminal 
contempt to punish the defendant and to vindicate the public interest in 
seeing that court orders are obeyed. The second is compensatory 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author thanks Jean Wyant and Neil Berk-
hoff for helping him with this article. 
I. See generally Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 37, 106 (1915). 
2. V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 86-108 (1974). 
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contempt, the subject of this study. Compensatory contempt salvages 
something for the plaintiff by awarding the money originally concluded to 
have been inadequate. The judge attempts to formulate a money remedy 
for the plaintiff around the central irony that if money had been a 
satisfactory remedy, he would not have enjoined in the first place. 
The choice between compensatory contempt and creditor process 
involves general issues about collecting money judgments, preventing 
imprisonment for civil debt, and protecting third parties from creditor 
process. The choice of collection devices also raises issues about enforcing 
orders in regulatory and structural litigation; and it tests how strongly we 
believe in the substantive basis of these orders. Comparing enforcement 
techniques forces us to encounter again the conundrum: when will judges 
conclude that money is inadequate and order conduct? Imperfect 
performance by lawyers conceals answers to the foregoing and interposes 
questions about holding clients to counsel's decisions. More fundamental-
ly, this Article asks basic questions about judicial power; for throughout 
these lawsuits the limited government model competes with the archetype 
of judicial power as a roving commission to improve society by righting 
wrongs. 
An inevitable tension courses through contempt decisions. How 
much power does the legislature possess to control contempt? Should 
judges construe the federal contempt statute strictly, accepting its 
historical background3 and restrictive language?4 Or faced with actual 
injustice, should the judge construe the statute liberally, searching for 
implied or inchoate orders, constructive custody, and anticipatory breach? 
This is the view Chief Justice Fuller attacked when he was quoted as having 
said: "Brother B would codify all laws in an act of two sections: 1st, all 
people must be good; 2d, courts of equity are hereby given full power and 
authority to enforce the provisions of this act.''5 
All three lawsuits involve the relation between trial and appellate 
courts. Normally, if a successful trial court plaintiff secures a money 
judgment and defendant appeals, defendant posts a supersedeas bond. 
When the judge approves the bond, he stays execution. This stay stops the 
plaintiff from enforcing the judgment against defendant's assets. 6 If the 
3. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 
"Inferior" Federal Courts, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924). 
4. 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1976). 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
5. Gregory, Government by Injunction, II HARV. L. REv. 487, 510 (1898). 
6. FED. R. C1v. P. 62(d); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). 
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appellate court affirms, the plaintiff may recover from the bond.7 An 
injunction in favor of a successful plaintiff, however, will not be stayed 
automatically when defendant appeals. Injunctions are suspended only if 
either the trial or appellate court orders them stayed or the appellate court 
grants an appellate injunction. Either court may condition the stay on a 
bond. Unstayed injunctions continue to be effective; if the trial judge 
refuses to enjoin and plaintiff appeals without securing a stay or 
injunction, defendant r_nay do what plaintiff sought to prevent.8 
I. Berry v. Midtown Service Corp. 
Our first lawsuit grew out of a judgment for plaintiff in a wrongful 
death action. Defendant was granted a twenty day stay of execution to 
decide whether to appeal. During the stay, defendant "denuded itself of 
substantially all its assets by transferring them to various affiliated 
corporations."9 The court of appeals held that the conduct of the debtor 
and the transferees was not contempt: under the federal contempt statute a 
judgment debtor who succeeds in staying execution without posting bond 
and then, during the period of the stay, transfers all assets does not commit 
contempt that would lead to a compensatory award for the damages that 
plaintiff sustained. 10 There was no injunction, the judgment debtor did not 
stipulate anything, and the stay that restrained the creditor did not 
implicitly order the debtor to keep enough assets to satisfy the judgment. 
The court strictly construed the federal contempt statute, which allows a 
judge to punish "misconduct" that occurs in or close to the courtroom but 
restricts out-of-court contempt to violations of "any lawful writ, process, 
order, rule, decree, or command,"11 to mean that unless specific property 
was dissipated "a party must have violated an express court order before he 
can be punished for contempt. . . ."12 The Berry court, rejecting more 
liberal constructions of the New York contempt statute13 in favor of 
legislative control, 14 refused to convert a trial judge's necessary power to 
maintain order in a courtroom into a roving commission to punish out-of-
court misconduct. 
Admittedly, the judgment debtor's transfers hindered the plaintiff's 
efforts to collect the judgment. The creditor has two other remedies: she 
could have demanded a supersedeas bond; and she may yet pursue the 
7. II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2905 (1973). 
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED. R.APP.P.8; II C. WRIGHT&A. MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICEAND 
PROCEDURE§ 2904 (1973). 
9. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 308 U.S. 536, 
dismissed per stipulation of counsel, 308 U.S. 629 (1939). 
10. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939). 
II. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976). 
12. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1939). 
13. N.Y. JuD. LAW§ 773 (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
14. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1939). 
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assets as fraudulent conveyances.15 Having neglected to obtain 
supersedeas, however, plaintiff finds contempt to be a "sharper, swifter 
remedy" than fraudulent conveyance, particularly if the court uses 
coercive imprisonment to collect the compensatory award. 16 The Berry 
court wisely precluded the judgment creditor from converting the money 
judgment into a compensatory contempt award. 
II. THE GREEN VALLEY CREAMERY 
Let's examine how well the Berry result wears in litigation to carry out 
governmental policies. The first controversy to review is the marathon 
Parker contempt. Howard Parker and Green Valley Creamery fought the 
New Deal's Agricultural Marketing legislation, which required Parker to 
pay the government quite a bit of money, to the last ditch. The trial judge 
enjoined Green Valley Creamery to comply and ordered Parker to pay all 
the money then owed and thereafter due. The appellate court stayed the 
trial judge's order but required Parker to deposit the amount assertedly 
due into the district court's registry to abide the final result. Instead of 
depositing the money, Parker siphoned milk through another company, 
Stuart Milk. Stuart Milk skimmed off the excess before returning the milk 
to Green Valley. This disabled Green Valley from depositing the money. 
When the court of appeals held that the government won the litigation, 
Green Valley filed voluntary bankruptcy. 
The government proceeded against Parker for contempt. Contempt 
was refused for two reasons: Stuart Milk was not a party, and the 
government was thinking about coercive rather than compensatory 
contempt. Judge Magruder rescued the government case at this stage by 
suggesting that the contempt remedy be compensatory contempt, a 
monetary fine payable to the government.17 
Something had to be done. Parker had churned the assets sufficiently 
to disable Green Valley from paying; and then he argued that this success 
exonerated him from contempt. Without a compensatory award, Judge 
Magruder said, coercive imprisonment "would be ridiculously ineffective 
as a remedial process, for it is idle to put Parker in jail to make him cause 
Green Valley to do something it is no longer capable of doing."18 
Moreover, jailing Parker until a money award was paid would, if he was 
unable to pay, be imprisonment to collect a civil debt. Judge Magruder did 
suggest, however, that the trial judge might imprison Parker to coerce 
payment of a compensatory award. History records that the government 
15. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, Ill (2d Cir. 1939). 
16. I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PERFERENCES § 74a (rev. ed. 1940). See a/so 
Note, Transfer of Assets Pending Stay of Execution as Contempt of Court, 49 YALE LJ. 580, 581 
(1940). 
17. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1942). 
18. /d. 
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took the good judge's advice.19 The trial judge entered a compensatory 
award. Parker evaded the compensatory award and escaped from coercive 
imprisonment by filing individual bankruptcy and successfully discharg-
. h d 20 mg t e compensatory awar . 
In addition to misplacing compensatory contempt, the government 
failed to pursue standard creditors' remedies, particularly in the separate 
voluntary bankruptcies of Green Valley Creamery and Howard Parker. As 
Judge Magruder strongly hints/1 the way Green Valley-Parker used 
Stuart Milk to skim the government's money off the milk meant that the 
government very likely could recover the money. Perhaps Stuart Milk held 
the money as constructive trustee for the government.22 The government 
could not use contempt against Stuart Milk, a nonparty, but an action to 
impress the property with a constructive trust and to order Stuart Milk and 
responsible officers, such as Parker, to pay was clearly available.23 The 
government, however, probably did not need a constructive trust remedy 
but only to measure by defendants' gain; thus it could have sued Stuart 
Milk and Parker for money had and received.24 
As Judge Magruder also hinted, Green Valley Creamery's creditors 
may have been able to recover the money from Stuart Milk as a fraudulent 
19. Parker v. United States, 135 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737 (1943). 
20. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946). 
21. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 377-78 (1st Cir. 1942). 
22. REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 168(2) (1936). 
23. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 160, comment e, (1936). 
24. Klass v. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 291 Minn. 68, 190 N.W. 2d 493 (1971) (money 
paid to defendant by a third person belongs to plaintiff). A plaintiff has two similar remedies. First, the 
plaintiff may sue to recover money that the defendant has received from a third party and that in good 
conscience belongs to the plaintiff, seeking a money judgment measured by the defendant's gain. 
Second, the plaintiff may ask the judge to hold that the defendant retains the money as a constructive 
trustee. The money received action comports better with the prohibition against debt imprisonment 
than the constructive trust action. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to assure specie recovery. 
Before a judge will impose a constructive trust, a plaintiff must show that the trust res exists; then the 
judge will order the defendant in personam to convey it. The judge may enforce the order to convey 
with contempt in the form of coercive imprisonment. REsTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 160, commenff, 
comment e (1936). These features coordinate constructive trusts with the idea that using coercive 
contempt to enforce an equitable order to pay money violates the prohibition against debt 
imprisonment. The judge cannot imprison contemnor to coerce the impossible, for example, to pay 
money the contemnor no longer possesses or controls. Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669 
(1956). The judge can imprison contemnor to obtain a specific, existing item, for example a 
constructive trust res, without imprisoning for a civil debt. Ex parte Ridgley, 261 Mich. 42,245 N.W. 
803 (1932); Carnahan v. Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390,107N.W. 73,75 (1906). Butimprisoningcontemnor 
to enforce an order directing payment of a certain amount to a creditor incarcerates to collect a civil 
debt. Potter v. Wilson, 609 P.2d 1278 (Okla. 1980); Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 
Va. 612,75 S.E. 145 (1912); I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 239 at414 
n.67 (rev. ed. 1940). Writers use the term constructive trust when they need only ask for measurement 
by defendant's gain. See, e.g., Kronman, Specific Peiformance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 376-82 ( 1978). 
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Peiformance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 290 n.54 (1979). This overstatement is 
harmless unless someone imprisons a defendant to execute a nonexistent constructive trust res. 
Similarly, for reasons given above, Judge Magruder erred when he suggested coercive imprisonment to 
collect compensatory contempt from Parker. Unless the government showed that the money actually 
existed, an order requiring Parker to pay enforced with coercive imprisonment would imprison Parker 
for a civil debt. But cf White v. Wadhams, 211 Mich. 658, 179 N.W. 245 (1920) (coercive contempt 
approved [incorrectly] to collect money spent). 
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conveyance.25 The master found and the court accepted that Parker and 
Stuart Milk disabled Green Valley from paying to hinder and delay the 
government's efforts to collect from Green Valley.26 The conveyances were 
intended to and did diminish Green Valley's assets so that it was unable to 
pay the government. The transactions between Green Valley and Stuart 
Milk possess several fraudulent appearing aspects: a defendant conveyed 
for inadequate consideration during a lawsuit; the conveyance left the 
defendant without enough assets to pay the judgment; the nonparty 
transferee was owned and controlled by the people who controlled the 
defendant; and the transferee emerged with roughly the amount of the 
judgment. 27 In short, the transactions diminished Green Valley's assets so 
that it was unable to pay the judgment.28 The government or another 
Green Valley creditor may have been able to recover this money from 
Stuart Milk in a fraudulent conveyance action under state law29 or Green 
Valley's bankruptcy trustee may have recovered the sums to benefit its 
creditors.30 
It is not clear why the government pursued Parker through contempt 
rather than following standard creditor process. The bar to contempt in 
Berry did not exist, for Parker's conduct also violated an explicit court 
order. By this time, the government attorneys may have allowed revenge to 
take precedence over self-interest. In any event, the government eventually 
filed a claim in Parker's bankruptcy, collected a dividend of almost $2,000, 
and attempted unsuccessfully to bar discharge of the remaining 
$20,286.58.31 If the government had upset the Stuart Milk transfer earlier 
under a constructive trust, money had and received, or fraudulent 
conveyance theory, the author speculates that the government would have 
received more. Moreover, if the government had instituted involuntary 
bankruptcy against Parker and shown that he had conveyed fraudulently, 
Parker would have been stripped of his assets, yet his discharge would have 
been barred and he would have been exposed to criminal prosecution.32 
Perhaps bankruptcy was the better road to revenge, for contempt turned 
out to possess unanticipated humane attributes. 
25. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1942). 
26. !d. 
27. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§§ 298, 319,339, 340 (rev. ed. 
1940). 
28. !d. at § 275. 
29. In 1924 Massachusetts had adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. MAss. ANN. 
LAwsch.l09A§§ l-14(Law. Co-op.l975). The transactions probably violated§§ 6 & 7. 
30. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(d)(2)(c), (d), 11 U.S.C. 107(d)(2)(c), (d)(l976)(repealed 1979). 
11 U.S.C. app. § 548 (Supp. II 1978). By the time Parker filed personal bankruptcy, the fraudulent 
conveyance action was apparently time barred. 
31. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 1946). The government had recovered 
$20,000 on a supersedeas bond posted on appeal from the district court's compensatory contempt 
order. /d. 
32. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 3(a)(l), 11 U.S.C. § 2l(a)(l) (1976) (repealed 1979); Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898 § 14(c)(l), (4), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(l), (4)(1976)(repealed 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 152(1976). 
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More often, however, a compensatory contempt award for violating 
orders to pay will prejudice the defendant. The award might evade the 
statute of limitations and other protections in the formal collection 
scheme. If the contempt creditor may use coercive imprisonment to collect 
the compensatory award, the award may defeat the debtor's exemptions, 
squeeze payment from the debtor's family and friends, and allow the 
contempt creditor to receive a larger percentage than the debtor's other 
creditors. 
III. Griffin v. Prince Edward County 
The Griffin compensatory contempt grew out of opposition to a 
public policy more fundamental than milk marketing. After prolonged 
and bitter opposition to desegregating the local schools, the Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors ceased to operate public 
schools.33 In their place, ostensibly private schools were operated for white 
children funded largely by tuition grants to parents. The Supreme Court 
affirmed a district court injunction ordering the Board to reopen the 
public schools.34 The district judge, after receiving the mandate, ordered 
the Board to open the schools. 
Plaintiffs asked the district judge to enjoin the Board from processing 
tuition grants for the private schools. The district judge, however, refused 
to enjoin the Board from paying grants for 1964-65, the coming school 
year. Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal and sought to accelerate the appeal, 
but they omitted to seek a stay or an appellate injunction forbidding the 
Board from disbursing the money pending the appellate decision. The 
Chief Judge of the court of appeals asked the Board to agree not to pay 
grants before the court decided the appeal. The Board refused. The same 
night was an eventful one: The court of appeals clerk was told that the 
Board refused to stipulate. The Board met, voted to enlarge the grants for 
the coming year, ordered the grants paid, notified white parents, and 
disbursed $180,000 in checks. Most of the payee-parents cashed the checks 
before 9 A.M. the following day.35 
The district court and the court of appeals enjoined the Board to cease 
tuition grants for children in segregated public schools. The court of 
appeals held that the way in which the Board paid the 1964-65 grants 
constituted contempt, and it ordered the Board or its members to repay the 
money.36 Possible creditors' remedies will be discussed before returning to 
contempt. 
Knowing that a stay or appellate injunction would probably follow its 
33. See genera/(1•, B. SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS (1965). 
34. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
35. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206,208 (4th Cir. 1966)( en bane), cert. denied, 385 
u.s. 960 (1966). 
36. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206,212 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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refusal to stipulate, the Board disbursed the funds. Commentators agree 
that prejudgment gifts or transfers that leave defendants unable to pay 
judgments are fraudulent conveyances vulnerable to an action by 
claimants as subsequent creditors.37 Transactions by which both 
transferor and transferee intend to hinder transferor's creditors are always 
fraudulent. 38 
Were the Griffin plaintiffs, black students and citizens, protected 
under the fraudulent conveyance act from a transfer of public money to 
people who were not entitled to it? The plaintiffs were the ultimate 
benficiaries of the funds. The original fraudulent conveyance act of 1571 
condemned conveyances which injured "creditors and others," and the 
Virginia statute that is based upon it protects creditors and "other persons" 
against conveyances intended to defraud.39 Plaintiffs may have become 
creditors by suing Board members for damages for dispersing money 
illegally and depriving them of equal protection of the law under color of 
an unconstitutional state law.40 
Plaintiffs in Griffin, moreover, could have resorted to a taxpayers' 
action if they found it strained to think of themselves as creditors or 
"others" under the fraudulent conveyance statute. The Virginia court had 
held that supervisors who had been overcompensated could be enjoined 
from continuing the practice and required to restore the illegal payments.41 
This remedy resembles an action for money received or imposing a 
constructive trust on funds wrongfully paid by a trustee, and a court may 
order people who received the misappropriated funds to return them.42 
The white parents must have known what was in the air that evening, and 
the court might have ordered them to repay the money.43 
The recipients may have been vulnerable to another action to repay 
the grants they received. The white parents who received the money might 
well have held as constructive trustees for the ultimate beneficiaries. A 
fiduciary who transfers in violation of a duty to beneficiaries will discover 
that the recipient takes the property subject to the beneficiaries' interest.44 
If the funds no longer existed or if an in personam order was unnecessary, 
the beneficiaries could have sued the recipients for money had and 
received, seeking a money judgment measured by defendants' gain. 
The Griffin transfer also may be discussed by analogy to two latin-
37. Berryv. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, Ill (2d Cir. 1939); Twynes Case, 76Eng. Rep. 
809 (K.B. 1601); 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 339 (rev. ed. 1940). 
38. Lipman v. Norman Packing Co., 146 Va. 461,467, 131 S.E. 797,798 (1926); Click v. Green, 
77 Va. 827, 836-38 (1883); Henderson v. Hunton, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 926, 933 (1875). 
39. VA. CoDE § 55-80 (1974). 
40. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976). 
41. Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633 (1905). See Hill, Tort and Contract Claims 
Against Counties, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv 61 (1966). 
42. Jackson v. Norris, 72 Ill. 364 (1874). 
43. 65 MICH. L. REV. 1490, 1501 (1967). 
44. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 168(1) (1936). 
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named doctrines, lis pendens and in custodia legis. In actions concerning 
specific, described real property, lis pendens means that purchasers or 
transferees of the property during litigation take the property subject to the 
result of the litigation.45 Virginia courts, particularly federal courts, 
follow, or at one time followed, the idea that statutory lis pendens does not 
abolish common law lis pendens; and lis pendens, the courts said, applies 
even though plaintiff fails to file notice and even to personal property 
transferred during litigation.46 
Property in the court's "custody" because attached, garnished, under 
a receiver, or in an insolvent estate is subject to the outcome of the lawsuit. 
Property may come into judicial custody when an action is filed, and the 
doctrine may operate whether there is actual or constructive notice.47 One 
who interferes with property in custodia legis may be held in contempt.48 
The fictional custody serves the same useful purpose as lis pendens: it keeps 
a potential loser from impairing the winner's benefits. Both these doctrines 
produce results similar to a money received theory or deciding that the 
recipients held the property as constructive trustees.49 
The court of appeals found the Board guilty of contempt, utilizing a 
theory resembling in custodia legis. The Board, fully aware of what it was 
doing, interfered with property in the court's custody, put the subject 
matter of litigation beyond the court's reach, and destroyed the appellate 
court's ability to afford full relief to plaintiffs. The court held that the 
appeal was a "process" within the terms of the federal contempt statute and 
that defendants' conduct set the process to naught: "the putting of the 
subject-matter of this litigation beyond our reach was a defiance of this 
court, an anticipatory resistance to its ultimate orders or process."50 
The dissent is technically more sound. Rules and standard practice 
allow courts to stay conduct pending appeal and to grant appellate 
injunctions.51 No operative order clearly defining the proscribed conduct 
and promulgated prior to the conduct forbade defendants' actions. A 
judge's request to stipulate is not a "lawful writ, process, order, rule, 
45. \V. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 92 (2d ed. 1956); Note, Statutory Lis 
Pendens, 20 IowA L. REv. 476 (1935). 
46. Kingv. Davis, 137 F. 222,239 (W.D. Va. 1905),aff'dsubnom. Blankenshipv. King, 157 F. 
676 (4th Cir. 1906); Steinmann v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 61 I, 641, 93 S.E. 684, 694 (1917). 
47. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734,737 (1931); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I, 
14 (1901). 
48. Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Coger, 340 F. 
Supp. 612, 616 (W.D. Va. 1972) (Virginia law). 
49. Technically: (I) in custodia legis leads to a personal order to restore the property, Converse v. 
Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939); (2) lis pendens creates a lien on the property which 
the plaintiff may foreclose, 20 IowA L. REV. 476,483 (1935); (3) money received will result ina money 
judgment enforcible by execution, RESTATEMENT oF RESTITUTION§ 166 comment b (1936); and, (4) a 
judge will enter a personal order to the constructive trustee to execute the trust, by delivering the res to 
the plaintiff beneficiary. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 168 (I) (1936). 
50. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206, 2II (4th Cir. 1966). 
51. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d). 
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decree, or command."52 Absent an order or even an application for an or-
der, defendants were free to dissipate the funds. The issue was whether the 
continuing program of tuition grants was constitutional; even after the 
payment, the court could adjudicate that issue. 53 The majority opinion, 
the dissent concluded, ignored Congress's limits on contempt and reverts 
to an anachronistic conception of an unlimited, inherent contempt 
power.54 
The contempt remedy in Griffin was a compensatory award of money. 
Arguably, compensatory contempt should be approved when plaintiffs 
could have used parallel legal remedies.55 The court of appeals' result 
resembles allowing a winning trial court defendant to proceed, but after 
the appellate court reverses, telling her to pay for the harm done to the time 
of judgment. Thus, observers who sympathize with a compensatory 
contempt award in Griffin might feel quite differently about a punitive 
remedy or about using coercive contempt to collect the award. The Board's 
contemptuous transfer fits some creditors' remedies and is analogous to 
others. Our legal system was designed, however, to protect traditional 
forms of property and creditors rather than people claiming entitlements 
to government benefits. Perhaps the courts should build on Griffin to 
develop a new law of lis pendens-in custodia legis to aid their power to 
award effective relief in "new property" and structural litigation.56 
Perhaps, finally, the court of appeals intended the compensatory award to 
be a second injunction and perceived it as within its equitable power to 
fashion a remedy to resolve the mess.57 
On the other hand, perhaps Berry teaches us that compensatory 
contempt should not be expanded to encompass creditors' remedies. 58 
These remedies have substantive and procedural limits developed over the 
centuries to protect debtors and third parties. Further, they are embodied 
in codes and decisions and are accessible to people with legal research 
skills. Griffin-style compensatory contempt may be subject to abuses such 
as lack of warning, violating the exemption statutes, ignoring statutes of 
limitations, and injuring innocent third parties. Plaintiffs, under this view, 
should utilize available creditor's techniques and leave compensatory 
contempt within its traditional bounds. 
More fundamentally, Griffin raises the perennial question whether 
52. 18 u.s.c. § 401(3) (1976). 
53. 52 IOWA L. REV. 582, 587 (1966). 
54. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 1966). 
55. 52 VA. L. REV. 1556, 1568 (1966). 
56. United States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1974); National Forest Preservation 
Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408,411 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 485 
F.2d 780, 784 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
57. United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019(N.D. Miss. 1970),aff'dper 
curiam, 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971). 
58. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939); Note, Transfer of Assets Pending 
Stay of Execution as Contempt of Court, 49 YALE L.J. 580 (1940). 
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courts possess a roving commission under an inherent cont~mpt power or 
whether the statutes define and limit what courts can do through 
contempt. 59 In the face of massive resistance, remitting the black plaintiffs 
to a creditor's action in state court sounds callous indeed. The court of 
appeals responded to an outrage that perpetuated one of the most 
egregious examples of a caste system and the failure of democratic 
theory.60 
The proponents of compensatory contempt, however, must face the 
question whether the court's liberal, even specious, reading of contempt 
power under the statute is warranted. Old decisions that the majority read 
to support the roving commission view of contempt61 may be less 
meaningful today in light of changes in contempt on other fronts that 
reveal a more structured and defined approach.62 Also the weird and 
fantastic bankruptcy jurisdiction distinctions that gave rise to the in 
custodia legis theory of contempt for interfering with property in the 
court's "custody" have been replaced with relatively clear and accessible 
statutes. 63 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The strict construction-roving commission division in contempt will 
never be resolved. First, as Berry, Parker, and Griffin reveal, judicial 
attitudes and activism, social and legal change, and litigant's conduct will 
cause the issue to re-emerge in a new guise from time to time. Second, 
perhaps because of the policy conflicts, contempt statutes are 
anachronistic, incomplete, halting, and feeble. When legislatures respond 
in an intellectually respectable fashion to the issues that contempt raises,64 
we will need to reexamine the question whether contempt is defined or 
inherent. In the meantime, the author quotes Mr. Dunbar 
that no course is more dangerous than to justify the exercise of a doubtful 
power by the supposed necessities of a particular emergency. . . . It is no 
light matter that suspicion even should rest upon the judiciary of warping 
principles to meet the supposed exigencies of cases as to which the strongest 
passion of the community are aroused.65 
The material produces more satisfactory answers to the more modest 
59. Compare Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939) with Griffin v. County 
School Board,363 F.2d206(4thCir.l966). Compare65 MICH. L. REV. 1490(1967) with 52 VA. L. REV. 
1556, 1567-69 (1966). 
60. 52 IOWA L. REV. 582,588 (1966); 52 VA. L. REv. 1556, 1569 (1966). 
61. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932); Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Clay Center, 
219 u.s. 527 (1911). 
62. See, e.g., Bloom v. IJJinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (jury trial for serious criminal contempts). 
63. Isaacs v. HobbsTie&TimberCo.,282 U.S. 734(1931); Muellerv. Nugent, 184 U.S.! (1901); 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Supp. 1980); I I t:.S.C. app. §§ 362,541,549 (Supp. II 1978). See generally 
Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3, 16-17 (1978). 
64. 65 MICH. L. REV. 1490, 1502 (1967); 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 125, (1967). 
65. Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 L.Q. REV. 347, 366-67 (1897). 
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issues. Prudence compels us to respect at least the policy behind the 
protections for debtors and others built into creditor process. Compen-
satory contempt should never be used when it will frustrate the exemption 
statutes, the statute of limitations, or the ban on debt imprisonment. The 
inadequacy prerequisite for an injunction attempts, albeit imperfectly, to 
channel litigants into damage actions that are easier to adjudicate, less 
harsh on losing defendants, and simpler to enforce. Simple bipolar actions 
to recover money for past misconduct produce easier decisions to enforce 
than complex structural reform that seeks to achieve adherence to the 
Constitution and government regulation. If we believe in our Constitution 
and in government regulation, we must formulate a unified and flexible 
method to enforce these interests. It 'must avoid the extremes of excessive 
leniency, which evidences an unsteady commitment to the substantive 
standard, and draconian harshness, which converts respect into revenge 
and may create sympathy for the refractory defendant. The blood of the 
martyrs, the Romans learned, became the seed of the church. Moreover, 
when the parties must live with each other after the decision, preserving 
harmony may be more important than ali-or-nothing solutions. Judges 
have a duty to decide all controversies correctly, but, as comparing Berry 
with Parker and Griffin illustrates, their duty to overlook imperfect 
presentation is greater when structural or regulatory litigation presents 
public issues. In particular, we must beseech judges to maintain patience 
and creativity coupled with skepticism about achieving perfect solutions 
with blunt judicial remedies. 
